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I. INTRODUCTION
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
hibits the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation.1 Courts have frequently struggled over the scope of
this taking clause.2 Consequently, "[t]he judicial history reveals a
pattern of confusing and incompatible results."s
Ambiguity over the scope of the taking clause has resulted in
the merging of the concepts of eminent domain and land-use regu-
lation into an expanded theory of compensable takings.4 Tradition-
ally, the taking concept referred only to the state's actual appro-
priation of land in eminent domain actions.5 Land-use regulations,
by contrast, imposed restrictions on the use of land but did not
affect the landowner's right to exclusive possession. 6 The taking
1. In Chicago, B. & W.R.R. v. Chicago, 116 U.S. 226 (1899), the United States Supreme
Court held the fifth amendment applicable to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
2. For a comprehensive historical analysis of the taking issue, see generally F. BoS-
SELMAN, D. COLLINS & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973).
3. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 156 (1971).
4. Commentators have attributed the expansion of compensable takings to Justice
Holmes's opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In dicta, Justice
Holmes stated that the taking clause includes excessive exercises of a state's regulatory po-
lice power. Id. at 413.
5. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 634-36 (1887) (articulating the historical per-
spective); F. BOSSELMAN, D. COLLINS & J. BANTA, supra note 2, at 51; see also Sweet v.
Rechel, 159 U.S. 380 (1895).
6. The term "land-use regulation" is used by the courts to identify state and local gov-
ernmental restrictions and prohibitions on the use of land to protect the health, safety and
welfare of the community. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926) (zoning ordinance); Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905) (restrictions upon gar-
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concept was never used as a restraint on the state's police power,
no matter how onerous the land regulation. 7 By merging these con-
cepts, the courts have blurred the demarcation between takings
and regulations of land.8 The expanded theory of compensable tak-
ings appears to be the source of the uncertainty over what consti-
tutes a taking for purposes of the fifth amendment.
Under the expanded takings theory, courts balanced the de-
gree of government intrusion against the public benefit to be de-
rived from the use restriction.' By finding that the public benefit
outweighed the degree of intrusion, courts could disguise a tradi-
tional taking as a valid exercise of the police power. Until Loretto
v. TelePrompter Manhattan CATV Co.,'0 this expanded theory
was inadequate to protect property owners from invasions that,
under the historically rooted interpretation of the taking clause,
constituted a taking." In Loretto, the Supreme Court of the
United States departed from this expanded takings concept and
revived the historical interpretation. The Court held that govern-
ment action constituting a "permanent physical occupation" of
privately owned real property is, to the extent of the occupation, a
taking entitling the owner to just compensation under the fifth
amendment. 2 By rejecting the balancing test, the Loretto decision
clarifies the ambiguities associated with the takings concept.
Loretto involved a challenge to the constitutionality of section
828 of the New York Executive Law.'" Section 828 required land-
bage disposal); Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1878) (restrictions on the sale
of liquor).
7. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887); Northern Transp. Co. v. Chi-
cago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878).
8. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977); Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). Many courts have discussed the possibility
that a taking may result from mere regulation of land. At this writing, however, no federal
court has ordered a state or local government to pay for a diminution in value of property
caused by a zoning regulation.
9. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977); see infra note
55.
10. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
11. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964). See generally F.
BOSSELMAN, D. COLLINS & J. BANTA, supra note 2; Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fair-
ness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 1165 (1967).
12. 458 U.S. at 441. The Court emphasized that such an appropriation was an "intru-
sion of an unusually serious character," id. at 433, and "perhaps the most serious form of
invasion of an owner's property interests," id. at 435.
13. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 828 (McKinney Supp. 1982). The statute provided in part:
1. No landlord shall
a. interfere with the installation of cable television facilities upon his prop-
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lords to permit the installation of cable television ("CATV") facili-
ties on their property and prohibited them from demanding pay-
ment from the CATV company in excess of an amount determined
to be reasonable by the State Commission on Cable Television.
1 4
Relying on this statute, TelePrompter Manhattan CATV Co.
("TelePrompter") installed CATV facilities on New York City
apartment buildings.18 Jean Loretto, an apartment building owner,
objected to TelePrompter's installation of CATV facilities on her
building." In a class action against TelePrompter,' 7 Loretto chal-
lenged the installation on the ground that it was a trespass and
asserted that section 828 constituted a taking of private property
for public use without just compensation.1 8
erty or premises, except that a landlord may require:
i. that the installation of cable television facilities conform to such reason-
able conditions as are necessary to protect the safety, functioning and appear-
ance of the premises, and the convenience and well-being of other tenants;
ii. that the cable television company or the tenant or a combination
thereof bear the entire cost of the installation, operation or removal of such fa-
cilities; and
iii. that the cable television company agree to indemnify the landlord for
any damage caused by the installation, operation or removal of such facilities.
b. demand or accept payment from any tenant, in any form, in exchange
for permitting cable television service on or within his property or premises, or
from any cable television company in exchange therefor in excess of any amount
which the commission shall, by regulation, determine to be reasonable ...
Id.
The legislature enacted this statute to promote the rapid development of the cable tele-
vision industry "with optimum technology and maximum penetration. . . as rapidly as eco-
nomically and technically feasible," so that "the state would benefit from valuable educa-
tional and public services through cable television systems." Id. at § 811.
14. Pursuant to the statute, the Commission ruled that a one-time, one dollar payment
was a reasonable fee. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423-24.
15. The City of New York granted TelePrompter an exclusive franchise to install cable
facilities in certain areas of the city, which included the area of appellant's building. Id.
16. The New York Court of Appeals described the installation as follows:
On June 1, 1970 TelePrompter installed a cable slightly less than one-half
inch in diameter and of approximately 30 feet in length along the length of the
building about 18 inches above the roof top, and directional taps, approximately
4 inches by 4 inches by 4 inches, on the front and rear of the roof. By June 8,
1970 the cable had been extended another 4 to 6 feet and cable had been run
from the directional taps to the adjoining building at 305 West 105th Street.
Loretto v. TelePrompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 135, 423 N.E.2d 320, 324,
440 N.Y.S.2d 843, 847 (1981). TelePrompter also installed two large silver boxes on the roof.
17. The class consisted of all owners of real property on which TelePrompter had
placed any CATV component in the State of New York. Class-action status was granted in
accordance with Jean Loretto's request. Owners of single-family dwellings were excluded.
458 U.S. at 424 n.4.
18. Appellants sought money damages and injunctive relief. New York City, which had
granted TelePrompter an exclusive franchise, intervened. The New York Supreme Court
granted TelePrompter's and the city's motion for summary judgment, upholding the consti-
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This article analyzes the reasoning by which the Loretto Court
derived a rule from the confusing and incompatible precedent.19
The Court attempted to provide coherence to prior decisions, but
failed to denounce the expanded doctrine of takings or to reestab-
lish the necessary distinction between due process violations and
eminent domain actions. Instead, the Court created a narrow ex-
ception to the expanded doctrine of takings. This article resurrects
the historical dichotomy between eminent domain and land-use
regulation and proposes adoption of this distinction to clarify the
taking issue in future decisions.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TAKING CONCEPT
A. Historical Interpretation
The taking concept emerged during the transition from the
feudal system to individual ownership of private property.0 Under
the feudal system, an individual held land under a tenure granted
by the sovereign. Government appropriations did not involve "tak-
ings" of property because the sovereign was already the land-
owner. 1 With the decline of the feudal system and the rise of mod-
ern concepts of individual ownership and private property, the
power of the sovereign to appropriate land was recognized.1
2
Grotius, the seventeenth-century Dutch political philosopher,
first articulated this concept of eminent domain. 2' Grotius recog-
nized the principle of sovereignty-the power of the state to use,
alienate and destroy property for the benefit of society.24 He
tutionality of section 828. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed
the decision without opinion, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed, upholding sec-
tion 828 as a valid exercise of the legislative police power of the State. Id. at 424.
19. Beginning with the dicta in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922),
subsequent Supreme Court decisions obfuscated traditional notions of eminent domain.
Thus, it seemed possible to argue that just compensation was not the appropriate remedy
even where the government physically appropriated private property. In Loretto, the Court
took the opportunity to set the record straight-at least in a narrow set of circumstances.
20. P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 5 (1917). Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta
guaranteed landholders protection against deprivations of freeholds by the King. Chapter 39
is considered the source of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The due process
clause protects landowners from excessive regulations on the use of land. See Stever, Land
Use Controls, Takings and the Police Power-A Discussion of the Myth, 15 N.H.B.J. 149,
152 (1974).
21. See P. NICHOLS, supra note 20, at 5.
22. The power of eminent domain, in fact, is as old as political society, but its use has
become accepted with the rise of private land ownership. See id. at 4.
23. See H. GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 103, 104 (A.C. Campbell trans.
1901).
24. Id. at 104, 108.
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stated, however, that a moral obligation to compensate the prop-
erty owner attached to the government's exercise of eminent do-
main.25 Blackstone also recognized the government's inherent right
to take private property for the public good if the property owner
received "full indemnification" for the loss sustained.2 6 Both Gro-
tius and Blackstone indicated that exercises of eminent domain re-
ferred to the government's physical dominion and control over pri-
vate property.
2 7
Similarly, the drafters of the fifth amendment implicitly ac-
knowledged the power of federal sovereignty by requiring the gov-
ernment to compensate landowners when taking their property for
public use.2" The scope of compensable takings contemplated by
the drafters was consistent with Grotius's and Blackstone's inter-
pretations of the power of eminent domain.2" The fifth amendment
taking clause embodies this interpretation. 0
The United States Supreme Court's first significant interpre-
tation of the taking clause was in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.$'
There, the Court held that an invasion of land as an indirect result
of government action constituted a taking within the purview of
the fifth amendment. 2 In Pumpelly, a state statute authorized the
construction of a dam to control floods. The dam caused
permanent flooding on the plaintiff's land. The Court indicated
that the government had effectively taken control of the property
to the exclusion of the owner, who, consequently, was entitled to
compensation.s Adhering to the traditional interpretation of the
taking clause, the Court restricted its holding to actual physical
25. Id.
26. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139.
27. Regulations of land were customary in early England. These regulations, even if
they forbade landowners to develop their property, did not appear to have offended the
medieval sense of justice, since they were designed to promote the public benefit. "There is
no evidence that the founding fathers ever conceived that the taking clause could establish
any sort of restrictions on the power to regulate the use of land." F. BOSSELMAN, D. COLLINS
& J. BANTA, supra note 2, at 104.
28. Id. at 99-104.
29. See J. THAYER, 1 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 946-52 (1895).
30. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. COLLINS & J. BANTA, supra note 2, at 104-06.
31. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871); see Mercer, Regulation (Police Power) v. Taking
(Eminent Domain), 6 N.C. CENT. L. REv. 177, 180 (1975).
32. "[W]here real estate is actually invaded by super-induced additions of water, earth,
sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually
destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the Constitution
." 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 181.
33. Id. at 178.
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invasions of property.3 4
Sixteen years later, in Mugler v. Kansas,5 Justice Harlan ex-
panded Pumpelly by carefully distinguishing the power of eminent
domain from the police power of the state.3 " In Mugler, a brewery
owner argued that a state prohibition on the sale or manufacture
of intoxicating liquors destroyed the value of his property and,
therefore, could not constitutionally be enforced without payment
of compensation. Justice Harlan noted that the prohibition at-
tempted to protect the public health and safety, and thus was not
a taking within the meaning of the fifth amendment.3 7 If the gov-
ernment had acquired a proprietary interest in the property, there
would have been a compensable taking. 8 The Court held that the
regulation was not a taking, despite the impairment of the prop-
erty's use, because there was no encroachment on private prop-
erty.89 The Court thus perpetuated the historical interpretation of
the taking clause. The Mugler opinion remained the dispositive in-
terpretation of the taking clause until Justice Holmes's opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.0
B. Pennsylvania Coal and Its Progeny
Unlike Justice Harlan, Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal
saw no qualitative difference between traditional takings and legis-
lative exercises of the police power. He viewed the two concepts as
differing only in degree."1 In Pennsylvania Coal, an owner of land
had conveyed the surface of his property but had reserved the
right to remove the coal beneath. A statute enacted after this
transaction forbade mining so "as to cause the caving-in, collapse,
or subsidence" of any occupied land.42 The Court struck down the
statute as a violation of the taking clause on the ground that the
34. Id. at 180. Pumpelly indicates that a formal appropriation of property by the gov-
ernment is not necessary for there to be a taking. Government authorized action is enough.
35. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
36. See id. at 667-69. "A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that
are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the com-
munity, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for
the public benefit." Id. at 668-69.
37. Id. at 668.
38. Id. Compare id. at 667-69 (regulation on the use of land not a taking) with
Pumpelly, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 178-80 (encroachment constituted a taking).
39. 123 U.S. at 669.
40. 260 U.S. 393, 412-16 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
41. See id. at 415. "The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to
a certain extent, if regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking." Id.
42. Id. at 393 n.1.
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prohibition exceeded the state's police power.43 "To make it com-
mercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroy-
ing it."' 44 Under this view, "[w]hen [regulation] reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act." 5
Justice Holmes's opinion in Pennsylvania Coal expanded the
interpretation of a taking to include regulations of land use that
have a substantial impact on the value of private property." He
stated, however, that "Government hardly could go on if. . . prop-
erty could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law.' 7 Nevertheless, he noted that a regulation
causing substantial diminution in the value of land was tanta-
mount to a taking even though the owner continued to have pos-
session of and title to the land.48 The traditionally distinct con-
cepts of eminent domain and land-use regulation were thus merged
into a broad theory of compensable takings.49
After Pennsylvania Coal, the Court struggled to develop a
standard by which to apply Justice Holmes's theory and to deter-
mine where regulation ended and taking began. The Court did not
have to confront this problem in cases where it held that no taking
had occurred or where the government had physically invaded pri-
vate property.50 By sidestepping this issue, the Court avoided
drawing the line between takings and regulations. 1 The Court reit-
erated, in dicta, the notion that when government regulation goes
too far, the resulting diminution in the land's value is a taking.2
This dicta perpetuated the ambiguity caused by Pennsylvania
Coal. Although the courts continued to quibble over the proper
43. See id. at 416.
44. Id. at 414.
45. Id. at 413.
46. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. COLLINS & J. BANrA, supra note 2, at 125-26; Stever, supra
note 20, at 154.
47. 260 U.S. at 413.
48. Id. at 414.
49. Justice Holmes's theory placed the two concepts on a spectrum, each concept at a
different end. Somewhere on the spectrum is a line separating compensable takings from
mere regulations.
50. The Court held that no taking had occurred in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962), and in United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155,
166 (1958). By contrast, a physical invasion was held to constitute a taking in United States
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
51. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958);
United States v. Coltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952).
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scope of the taking clause, no court actually held that an overzeal-
ous regulation of land constituted a compensable taking.
Recent decisions have continued to obfuscate the issue of
where regulation ends and taking begins. In Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City,53 a statute enacted to preserve
historic buildings imposed restrictions on construction at the
Grand Central Terminal site. The owners of the land argued that
the restrictions effected a taking of their property. The Court at-
tempted to reconcile the inconsistencies of prior taking clause deci-
sions by formulating a balancing test. 4 Based on "essentially ad
hoc, factual inquiries," the test weighed the degree of intrusion
against the public benefit from the government action.55 Although
the historic preservation statute substantially impaired the owners'
rights to exploit the value of their property, it did not constitute a
taking."
The Penn Central decision is significant because it attempted
to derive a workable doctrine from the uncertainty that imbued
the prior taking clause cases. The Penn Central balancing test is,
however, inherently subjective, and courts have had difficulty de-
fining its limits.57 Since Penn Central, the Court has avoided stat-
ing whether overzealous regulations on the use of land may be a
compensable taking, and has adhered to the amorphous concept of
takings developed by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal.58
One year after Penn Central, in Kaiser Aetna v. United
States," the Court reaffirmed the traditional interpretation of the
taking clause. The Court held that a compensable taking had oc-
curred when the government enforced a public right of access to a
body of water made navigable by private enterprise. 0 Property
owners had developed a residential marina around a pond by
dredging a passageway from the pond to a bay. Under state law,
the pond was private property. The federal government argued
that it had the right to regulate access to the new marina pursuant
53. 438 U.S. 104 (1977).
54. See id. at 124.
55. Id. The Court identified several relevant factors from prior cases to weigh in the
balancing test: (1) "The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant," (2) "the extent
to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations," and
(3) "the character of the governmental action." Id.
56. Id. at 138.
57. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
58. See infra note 63.
59. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
60. Id. at 178-80.
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to the federal navigational servitude. 6' The Court disagreed, how-
ever, stating, "This is not a case in which the Government is exer-
cising its regulatory power in a manner that will cause an insub-
stantial devaluation of petitioners' private property; rather, the
imposition of the navigational servitude in this context will result
in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina."'62 In
Kaiser Aetna, the Court reaffirmed "one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property-the right to exclude others.""
C. Setting the Stage for Loretto
In Agins v. City of Tiburon" and San Diego Gas & Electric
Co. v. City of San Diego,6 5 the Court again declined to decide
whether regulation of land amounted to a compensable taking. In
Agins, landowners challenged a zoning ordinance passed after they
acquired their property, contending that it completely destroyed
the value of their property for any purpose. The Court affirmed the
California Supreme Court's dismissal, holding that the zoning ordi-
nance, which restricted land use to single-family residences, did
not on its face effect a taking of the landowners' property without
just compensation. Consequently, the Court did not pass on the
state court's ruling that, even if the zoning ordinance did effect a
taking, the landowners' only remedies were declaratory judgment
and mandamus.66 In San Diego Gas, a utility company sued to re-
cover the value of property allegedly taken as a result of down-
zoning from industrial use to an open space plan for a public park,
making it impossible for the owner to use the land. The Court dis-
61. See id. at 170.
62. Id. at 180.
63. 444 U.S. at 176. Despite this reaffirmation, the Court restricted the landowner's
right of exclusive possession in Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
There, the Court applied the balancing test from Penn Central to find no taking had oc-
curred. In Prune Yard, a shopping center owner challenged a state statute that authorized
individuals to exercise free speech and petition rights on the premises. Even though the
statute authorized physical occupation of solicitors on private property, "the fact that (the
solicitors] may have 'physically invaded' appellants' property cannot be viewed as determi-
native." Id. at 84, quoted in Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434. The Court concluded that because
shopping center owners hold the property open to the public, the right to exclusive posses-
sion was no longer "so essential to the use or economic value of their property that the
state-authorized limitation of it amounted to a 'taking'." Id.
64. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
65. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
66. 447 U.S. at 263.
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missed the appeal on procedural grounds. 7 Thus, the majority
avoided addressing the problem of the scope of the taking clause.
Although the case was dismissed on procedural grounds, the
difference of opinion between the majority and the dissent in San
Diego Gas regarding the holding of the California Supreme Court
in Agins is particularly significant and indicates the Court's uncer-
tainty as to the scope of the semantically ambiguous term "tak-
ing."60 Justice Brennan, in dissent, proposed a rule that would re-
affirm Justice Holmes's decision in Pennsylvania Coal.ee Under
Justice Brennan's suggested rule, "once a court finds that a police
power regulation has effected a 'taking,' the government entity
must pay just compensation. 7 0 This rule attempts to resolve the
dispute over the scope of the taking clause. A majority of Justices
agreed in principle with the rule suggested by Justice Brennan.
7 1 It
appeared that Justice Brennan's approach would prevail in the
Court's next taking clause case.
Justice O'Connor, who had never rendered an opinion on this
subject, replaced Justice Stewart, a member of the San Diego Gas
dissent. Because it was not known whether Justice O'Connor would
share Justice Brennan's view, how the Court would resolve the tak-
ing controversy again became unpredictable. It was unclear
whether the Court would adopt the expanded interpretation that
Justice Brennan espoused, or would return to the traditional inter-
pretation of the taking clause.
67. See 450 U.S. at 633. The majority held that the appeal was not from a final judg-
ment because the court of appeals failed to decide the question of whether a taking occurred
at all. Id.
68. Justice Blackmun for the majority stated: "Contrary to the disaent's argument, the
California Supreme Court's Agin8 decision did not hold that a zoning ordinance never could
be a 'taking' and thus never could violate the Just Compensation Clause. It simply limited
the remedy available for any such violation to nonmonetary relief." Id. at 628 n.8. In con-
trast, Justice Brennan wrote in dissent:
It is not merely linguistic coincidence that the California Supreme Court in
Agins never analyzed the Tiburon zoning ordinance to determine whether a
Fifth Amendment "taking" without just compensation had occurred. Instead,
the court noted that "a zoning ordinance may be unconstitutional and subject to
invalidation only when its effect is to deprive the land-owner of substantially all
reasonable use of his property," and that "[t]he ordinance before us had no such
effect."
Id. at 641 n.4.
69. Id. at 658. Justice Brennan, however, has gone one step further in asserting that the
remedy for a regulatory taking is just compensation.
70. Id.
71. Joining Justice Brennan's dissent were Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell.
Though concurring in the majority's result, Justice Rehnquist "would have little difficulty in
agreeing with" Justice Brennan's proposed rule. Id. at 633.
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San Diego Gas and Agins representconflicting interpretations
of the scope of the taking clause. Subsequent lower court decisions
have either argued the traditional interpretation of the taking
clause or cited Justice Brennan's approach as the dispositive test
for compensable takings."' The resulting confusion necessitated a
reconciliation of these inconsistencies. The timeliness of the
Loretto factual circumstances, the presence of Justice O'Connor on
the Court, and the potential difficulty of facilitating public access
to CATV provided the necessary impetus for the Court to chal-
lenge the taking clause precedent.
III. THE REASONING OF Loretto
In Loretto, the Court attempted to lend coherence to the in-
consistent taking clause decisions. Although the decision dealt pri-
marily with facilitating access to the modern technological wonder
of CATV, the Loretto Court followed the reasoning of decisions in
the late 1800's and early 1900's that dealt with analogous contro-
versies.". The Loretto decision is significant because the Court de-
parted from the broad takings concept that emanated from Penn-
sylvania Coal and substantially revived the traditional
interpretation of the taking clause.
Although the Loretto Court did not expressly adopt either
Justice Holmes's or Justice Harlan's theory, the Court seemed im-
plicitly to rearticulate Justice Harlan's historical interpretation of
the taking clause. The Court ignored the ad hoc inquiry advocated
in the Court's most recent land regulation cases.7"' The Court also
found the balancing test from Penn Central Transportation Co.
inadequate to protect property owners' expectations of exclusive
possession.7 5 Rather than balance the degree of intrusion against
the public benefit, the Loretto majority maintained that the char-
acter of the government's action was the determinative factor. The
72. Decisions following Justice Brennan's approach include: Shamrock Dev. Co. v. City
of Concord, 656 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir. 1981); Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590,
598-99, 432 A.2d 15, 19-20 (1981). Decisions advocating a more traditional analysis are:
Fountain v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038, 1043 (11th Cir. 1982);
Gilliland v. County of Los Angeles, 126 Cal. App. 3d 610, 179 Cal. Rptr. 73, 76-77 (1981).
73. Beginning with Pumpelly, the Court identified the physical invasion decisions.
Moreover, the Court analogized the telephone, telegraph, and other wire decisions to the
circumstances in Loretto. See 458 U.S. at 426-35.
74. See San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. 621 (1980) (rezoning to open-space plan made prop-
erty worthless for intended use as nuclear generating station); Agins, 447 U.S. 255 (1979)
(zoning ordinance that placed density and other restrictions on appellant's property).
75. See 458 U.S. at 426.
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Court stated a per se rule: "[W]hen the physical intrusion reaches
the extreme form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has
occurred.
76
In support of its conclusion, the Court examined the pre-
Pennsylvania Coal cases. A critical factor in the Court's reasoning
was its distinction between permanent and temporary occupations
of land." The Court emphasized the significance of this distinction
by contrasting Pumpelly with the later case of Transportation Co.
v. Chicago.7
In Transportation Co. v. Chicago, construction of a tunnel
prevented a landowner from having access to his property. The
Court stated that "acts done in the proper exercise of governmen-
tal powers, and not directly encroaching upon private property,
though their consequences may impair its use, are universally held
not to be a taking within the meaning of the constitutional provi-
sion."'79 Because there was no actual entry upon the owner's land,
the temporary impairment was not an uncompensated taking.80
The Court in Transportation Co. v. Chicago distinguished
Pumpelly as a case involving a "practical ouster of possession,"
which constituted a taking."1 The Loretto Court also distinguished
other "flooding cases" involving permanent physical occupations
from those involving only temporary invasions to demonstrate that
occupations of private property must be permanent to constitute a
taking.82
In Loretto, the Court suggested that the permanent intrusions
in the "flooding cases" were similar to the permanent installation
of TelePrompter's cables.83 In United States v. Kansas City Life
Insurance Co.,84 the Court treated an actual permanent invasion of
76. Id. "We conclude that a permanent physical occupation authorized by government
is a taking without regard to the public interest that it may serve." Id.
77. See id. at 427-30.
78. 99 U.S. 635 (1878).
79. Id. at 642.
80. See id. at 645.
81. Id. at 642.
82. See 458 U.S. at 428. Compare United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 468-70 (1903)
(flood involved permanent invasion, and thus constituted a taking), and United States v.
Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 327-28 (1917) (flood involved a permanent invasion, and thus consti-
tuted a taking), with Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217, 225 (1904) (no taking because
only temporary invasion), and Sanguinetti v. United States, 246 U.S. 146, 149 (1924) (no
taking because only temporary invasion).
83. After the Court explained the application of the traditional test by examining the
"flooding cases," it held, "TelePrompter's cable installation on appellant's building consti-
tutes a taking under the traditional test." 458 U.S. at 438.
84. 339 U.S. 799 (1950).
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property as a divestment of the owner's rights in his land. 5 There,
severe flooding from percolating waters effectively destroyed pri-
vate property." The permanency of the damage constituted a com-
pensable taking. Like the landowner whose land was appropriated
by flooding caused by government action, the New York apartment
building owners in Loretto suffered a permanent loss of use of
their property due to a physical intrusion.
The Loretto Court compared the decisions in United States v.
Pewee Coal Co.87 and United States v. Eureka Mining Co.es to
demonstrate the demarcation between temporary and permanent
invasions. In Eureka Mining, a government regulation had caused
a gold mine to be closed during wartime in order to conserve
equipment and manpower. The Court held that this was not a tak-
ing because "the Government did not occupy, use, or in any man-
ner take physical possession of the gold mines or of the equipment
connected with them."89 In Pewee Coal, the Court found a taking
of private property based on an "actual taking of possession and
control,"90 where the government had taken permanent control.
Similarly, in Loretto, the CATV installation was an appropriation
of the apartment owners' rights in their land. The Loretto Court
noted that the permanent physical occupation was an injury differ-
ent in kind from a temporary invasion, and, therefore, the owner
deserved the protection of the taking clause. 1
The Loretto interpretation of the taking clause is analogous to
the principles enunciated in St. Louis v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co.9 2 In Western Union Telegraph, a telegraph company
85. See id. at 810.
86. Id. at 810-12. "The percolation raised the water table and soaked the land suffi-
ciently to destroy its agricultural value. The continuous presence of this raised water table
also blocked the drainage of the surface and subsurface water in a manner which helped to
destroy the productivity of the land." Id. at 810 (footnote omitted).
87. 341 U.S. 114 (1951).
88. 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
89. Id. at 165-66. "All that the Government sought was the cessation of the consump-
tion of mining equipment and manpower in the gold mines and the conservation of such
equipment and manpower for more essential war uses." Id. at 166.
90. 341 U.S. at 116. By executive order, the Secretary of the Interior was to take imme-
diate possession and operate or arrange to operate the coal mine. The government also:
required mine officials to conduct their operation as agents for the government; required the
American flag to be flown; posted signs that read "United States Property" on the premises;
and appealed to the miners to dig coal as a public duty. Id.
91. 458 U.S. at 439. "A permanent physical occupation is a government action of such a
unique character that it is a taking without regard to other factors that a court might ordi-
narily examine." Id. (footnote omitted).
92. 148 U.S. 92 (1893).
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placed poles on public streets pursuant to a city ordinance. After
the poles were installed, the city levied a tax on the company's
permanent and exclusive appropriation of a part of the public
streets. The Court stated that it was a "misconception" to suppose
that the privilege to perform a service for the public carried with it
"the unrestricted right to appropriate the public property of a
State."9 Although that case involved an appropriation of public
property, the Court stated that the same principle applied to tak-
ings of private property: "No matter how broad and comprehensive
might be the terms in which the franchise was granted, it would be
confessedly subordinate to the right of the individual not to be de-
prived of his property without just compensation. '94 Applying
these principles in Loretto, TelePrompter's franchise was
subordinate to the landlords' property rights. Therefore, the ap-
propriation by TelePrompter was a compensable taking. 5
The Loretto majority examined the taking clause controversies
that had resulted from earlier technological advances. Courts have
found appropriations to be compensable takings in cases involving
telegraph and telephone lines, train rails, and underground pipes
and wires. 6 Consistently with these cases, the Loretto Court ar-
gued that "constitutional protection for the rights of private prop-
erty cannot be made to depend on the size of the area permanently
occupied. '9 7 In United States v. Causby,98 the Court had indicated
that questions of constitutional dimension are matters of principle,
not necessarily of degree.9 9 In contrast, the dissenting Justices in
93. Id. at 100. "No one would suppose that a franchise from the Federal government to
a corporation, State or national, to construct interstate roads or lines of travel transporta-
tion or communication, would authorize it to enter upon the private property of an individ-
ual, and appropriate it without compensation." Id. at 100-01.
94. Id. at 101.
95. 458 U.S. at 438.
96. See, e.g., Lovett v. West Va. Cent. Gas Co., 65 W. Va. 739, 65 S.E. 196 (1909) (gas
pipelines); cf. Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922)
(guns shot from fort); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Penn. R.R., 195 U.S. 540 (1904) (telegraph
lines).
97. 458 U.S. at 438 (footnote omitted).
98. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
99. See id. at 262. The issue in Causby was whether frequent and regular flights of
army and navy aircraft over respondent's land constituted a fifth amendment taking. Since
"[tihe landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or
use in connection with the land," id. at 264, flights over the land if "so low and so frequent
as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land," id. at
266, invoke the fifth amendment taking clause as a remedy.
[A]n owner is entitled to the absolute and undisturbed possession of every part
of his premises, including the space above, as much as a mine beneath. If the
wire had been a huge cable, several inches thick and but a foot above the
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Loretto argued that the CATV installation was not of constitu-
tional significance because its interference with a private property
interest was de minimis.100 The Loretto majority tacitly disap-
proved of the dissent's willingness to reduce the taking issue to a
subjective measuring of the extent of the cable's intrusion upon
the buildings' rooftops. 101 The majority concluded that the critical
factors in determining whether a taking had occurred were objec-
tive and that, therefore, the extent of the occupation would rarely
be an issue. 2
Implicit in the taking concept is the idea that a property own-
er is entitled to exercise complete dominion over his property, sub-
ject to the limitations on use imposed by the state for the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens.'03 The Loretto dissent argued
that section 828 of New York's CATV statute served a legitimate
public purpose, analogous to other statutes regulating the use of
rental property. 0 4 The dissent proposed that the intrusion upon
the landlords' property by the CATV facility be balanced against
the public benefit of widely distributed CATV. 05 The majority
ground, there would have been a difference in degree, but not in principle. Ex-
pand the wire into a beam supported by posts standing upon abutting lots with-
out touching the surface of plaintiff's land, and the difference would still be one
of degree only. Enlarge the beam into a bridge, and yet space only would be
occupied. Erect a house upon the bridge, and the air above the surface of the
land would alone be disturbed.
Id. at 265 n.10 (quoting Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 491-92, 79 N.E. 716, 718
(1906)).
100. Justice Blackmun stated in dissent, "I would be prepared to hold that the incre-
mental governmental intrusion caused by that four- to six-foot wire, which occupies the
cubic volume of a child's building block, is a de minimis deprivation entitled to no compen-
sation." 458 U.S. at 448-49 n.6.
101. The majority stated, "[F]ew would disagree that if the State required landlords to
permit third parties to install swimming pools on the landlords' rooftops for the convenience
of the tenants, the requirement would be a taking." Id. at 436.
102. The Court stated, "The placement of a fixed structure on land or real property is
an obvious fact that will rarely be subject to dispute." Id. at 437.
103. 1 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, No. 1, at
15 (repl. 1980); cf. 458 U.S. at 435-37.
104. 458 U.S. at 448-50 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 451 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that "§ 828 merely de-
fines one of the many statutory responsibilities that a New Yorker accepts when she enters
the rental business." Id. at 448. Thus, if appellant converted her property into other than
rental property, she would no longer be subject to the regulation.
Not every physical attachment to rental property constitutes a taking. See id. at 447-51
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Section 828, however, prohibits landlords from exacting any
compensation for the intrusion either from their tenants or from the cable companies. The
majority reasoned that the dissent's analysis
would allow the government to require a landlord to devote a substantial portion
of his building to vending and washing machines, with all profits to be retained
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recognized the states' need to have "broad power to regulate hous-
ing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant relationship in
particular without paying compensation for all economic injuries
that such regulation entails."1 6 A permanent physical occupation,
however, is a qualitatively more severe intrusion than is a regula-
tion on the use of land. Section 828, therefore, was beyond the
scope of a police power regulation.
10 7
Section 828, in effect, authorized a third party to enter and
attach CATV facilities without regard to the property owner's
right to exclusive possession. None of the regulatory statutes cited
in the Loretto dissent authorized a permanent physical occupation
of a landlord's property by a third party.10 8 Those regulatory stat-
utes merely required the landlord to take affirmative action or to
abstain from an activity. Property owners typically maintained
some control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion
even though the regulatory statute may have provided in detail the
manner of the landlord's compliance.109 Section 828, in contrast,
denied landlords the right to exercise any control over the CATV
installation.110 The Loretto Court indicated that, if Jean Loretto
had been allowed to exercise control over the CATV installation or
had been required to purchase the facility for the benefit of her
tenants, the statute might have presented a different question.1
Because section 828 permitted a third party physically to invade
private property, and because it gave the landlords no control over
the manner of compliance with the statute, the Loretto majority
concluded that the occupation of a portion of Jean Loretto's roof-
top constituted a taking within the purview of the fifth
amendment. "
Loretto presents a narrowly defined per se rule for compensa-
ble takings. The rule applies only to government authorized per-
by the owners of these services and with no compensation for the deprivation of
space. It would even allow the government to requisition a certain number of
apartments as permanent government offices. The right of a property owner to
exclude a stranger's physical occupation of his land cannot be so easily
manipulated.
Id. at 439 n.17.
106. Id. at 439.
107. Id. at 435-36.
108. See id. at 449 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
109. Many statutes, for example, required landlords to pursue the manner of compli-
ance. See id.
110. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 828(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1982).
111. See 458 U.S. at 440-41 n.19.
112. See id. at 441.
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manent and physical occupations of private property by a third
party. The Loretto holding prohibits the application of state stat-
utes that authorize uncompensated permanent physical occupa-
tions of land even where the public benefit outweighs the degree of
intrusion: "[W]e conclude that a permanent physical occupation
authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public
interests that it may serve." 113 This rule protects property owners
from government overreaching under the guise of land-use regula-
tions that purport to promote the health, safety and welfare of the
public. This narrow rule precludes courts from engaging in a sub-
jective balancing test that weighs the degree of intrusion against
the public benefit.
IV. THE IMPACT OF Loretto
The Loretto Court substantially revived the historically rooted
interpretation of the fifth amendment taking clause, but it failed
to articulate the distinction between takings in eminent domain
and regulatory exercises of the police power. In ignoring this dis-
tinction, the Loretto Court has merely carved out an exception to
the expanded theory of compensable takings. The Court did not
clarify the scope of the semantically ambiguous term "taking,"
which has led courts to confusing and inconsistent decisions. Since,
prior to Loretto, the term was used to denote overzealous regula-
tion of the use of land, Loretto leaves open the question of whether
land-use regulation can ever constitute a taking within the purview
of the fifth amendment." 4 The Loretto majority seems to have
fallen into the trap set by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal,
which subsequent decisions have perpetuated.
As a consequence of this "semantic trap,"'1 5 future courts will
encounter similar difficulty in ascertaining the scope of the taking
clause. Distinguishing between takings in eminent domain and reg-
ulatory action under the police power is critical to understanding
the scope of the taking clause. Property is "taken in the constitu-
tional sense" when the government authorizes an intrusion upon
an owner's use of his land to the extent that the state acquires a
113. Id. at 426.
114. Rather than focus on the ambiguous term "taking," the Loretto Court chose not to
define the scope of the taking clause but accomplished a similar result by formulating an
exception to the ambiguous rule. The Loretto holding leaves the dictum of prior decisions
intact concerning whether or not a regulation could ever constitute a taking.
115. Freilich, Solving the "Taking" Equation: Making the Whole Equate the Sum of
Its Parts, 1982 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 301, 322.
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servitude over the land.1"6 A taking thus may occur even without
physical appropriation if the owner's right to use and enjoy his
land is destroyed by a governmental act.'1 7 In these circumstances,
the owner's loss is the same as if the government had entered upon
and taken possession of the land. Land-use regulation does not dis-
turb the owner's control or use of his property for lawful pur-
poses.1 8 These regulations restrict the use of property for purposes
that the legislature declares, by valid legislation, to be injurious to
the health, morals or safety of the community." 9 The owner is free
to dispose of his land or to use it for any lawful purpose. Land-use
regulations are declarations by the state that certain uses are prej-
udicial to the public interest. 2 ° By adopting this distinction be-
tween eminent domain actions and land-use regulations, courts
would revitalize the historical interpretation of the taking and due
process clauses. This demarcation would provide an objective basis
for ascertaining the scope of the taking clause and would clarify
the ambiguity surrounding the taking clause decisions.
The pre-1922 constitutional land decisions provided distinct
remedies for exercises of eminent domain and excessive regulations
of land: exercises of eminent domain triggered the protections of
the taking clause and the remedy of just compensation;' 2' excessive
116. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947).
117. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945), where the Court
stated, "Governmental action short of acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, if its
effects are so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject
matter, to amount to a taking." Id. at 378. See also Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.,
233 U.S. 546 (1914); United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333 (1910).
118. The most common example of land-use regulation is zoning, which prohibits land-
owners from using their property in a manner that the legislative body deems inappropriate.
119. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962) (quoting Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887)). The due process clause requires that there be at least
a rational relationship between the state's exertion of power and the social ends sought to be
achieved. Thus, the courts will generally sustain regulation of land based on rational public
policy. In Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), a particular application of a
zoning law was invalidated. There, the zoning ordinance was declared unconstitutional be-
cause it was shown to be "a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power, having no sub-
stantial relation to the public health, the public morals, or the public safety or the public
welfare in the proper sense." Id. at 187-88 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)).
120. The use the landowner prefers may be deemed unlawful. This restriction, however,
does not preclude the owner from using the land for other lawful purposes. A prohibition of
certain uses is not equivalent to a physical intrusion on private property. In the former
instance, the owner still can make profitable use of his property, but in the latter case, a
portion of his property is no longer available for any use.
121. As early as 1853, in Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) (1853), Chief Jus-




regulation of land invoked the due process clause and the remedy
of injunctive or declaratory relief.1 22 Excessive land-use regulation
that does not constitute a taking within the scope suggested by
this article may, nonetheless, be a violation of the due process
clause. 2 The remedy for such onerous regulation is injunctive or
declaratory relief against the regulation's enforcement. 24 This is
consistent with the traditional eminent domain-regulation dichot-
omy. The major problem in applying this distinction is determin-
ing whether a taking in fact has occurred. If there is a taking, the
appropriate remedy is just compensation. If, however, the facts in-
dicate a mere regulation on the use of land, the court should weigh
the degree of the governmental intrusion against the public benefit
before awarding injunctive or declaratory relief.
Just compensation is not the appropriate remedy for every
governmental action that results in a deprivation of property or a
diminution of property value. For this reason, actions in eminent
domain historically have been subject to the protections of the tak-
ing clause, and other deprivations of property rights have been
treated under a due process analysis.
A dichotomy between constitutional remedies for takings and
excessive regulations of land underlies this analysis. 2 5 Where the
We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well ordered
civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified
may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so
regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of
the community. . . .Rights of property, like all other social and conventional
rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment, as shall
prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regula-
tions established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling
power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.
This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of the
government to take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever
the public exigency requires it; which can be done only on condition of providing
a reasonable compensation therefor.
Id. at 84-85.
122. R. MoTr, DUE PRocEss OF LAW 314-19 (1926); see also State v. Noyes, 30 N.H. 279
(1855) (city could prohibit bowling alleys within a specified distance of dwellings).
123. The due process clause limits the government's exercise of its regulatory police
power. Thus, if regulation is disproportionately onerous in light of its societal benefits, a
property owner may invoke the protections of the due process clause.
124. See Freilich, supra note 115, at 347.
125. This is not to suggest that money damages may never be an appropriate remedy
for excessive regulation of land. Just compensation, however, is the exclusive remedy for
actions in eminent domain.
The author does not suggest that the government may, through land-use regulation,
achieve the same objectives as through actions in eminent domain. If restrictions on land
19831
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
government, as in Loretto, has indirectly exerted dominion and
control over the property, this action triggers the remedy of just
compensation. The express terms of the fifth amendment taking
clause provide this remedy. Just compensation traditionally has
served as a limitation on the caprice of government in the exercise
of its sovereign powers.' Implicit in the idea of just compensation
was the notion of a unique remedy for physical appropriations by
the government.
27
The suggested dichotomy between eminent domain and over-
zealous land-use regulation reaffirms the intent of the drafters of
the taking and due process clauses. Property owners would have
greater protection under this distinction, since legitimate claims of
deprivation would no longer be lost because they are not within
the amorphous taking clause. A return to this historically rooted
dichotomy would preclude the judicial legislation inherent in the
balancing test proposed in Pennsylvania Coal and its progeny. 28
V. CONCLUSION
Loretto restores vitality to the battered taking clause. In addi-
tion to announcing a per se rule, however, the Loretto Court
should have rearticulated the historical distinction between emi-
nent domain and land-use regulation. In failing to express this di-
chotomy, the Court resolved only some of the difficulties that ema-
nated from the recent taking clause decisions. The question is left
use are such as to render the land worthless, then there may be a taking. Also, nontrespas-
sory takings in eminent domain are still possible. In fact, United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 (1946), and its progeny have generally been regarded as stretching the concepts of prop-
erty and taking. The intrusions have been called airspace easements or aviation easements.
It is the permanency of the easement that makes it a taking. Thus, these easements reflect
broader notions of physical property and traditional takings.
126. B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATEs-THE
RIGHTS OF PROPERTY 235 (1965). The fifth amendment taking clause is "a tacit recognition
of a pre-existing power to take private property for public use, rather than a grant of new
power." Id. (quoting United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946)). One commen-
tator has noted,
As the Supreme Court has phrased it, the organic guaranty "that private prop-
erty shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."
Id. at 256 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
127. See id. at 234-55; Freilich, supra note 115, at 347-49.
128. It is difficult to apply a balancing test involving subjective criteria and many vary-
ing factual circumstances. Legislating is not a proper function of the courts, and when




open whether land-use regulation may, ever constitute a taking
within the broad theory of compensable takings. If future courts
can avoid the "semantic trap" of the taking clause, then the
Loretto decision will have made a significant contribution to un-
raveling the "crazy quilt pattern of Supreme Court doctrine" ' 9
that is characteristic of the taking clause.
ROBERT D. RUBIN
129. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme
Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. Rav. 63, 63.
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